Tests whether framing a request for unsafe content as file/data generation for a "test fixture" — rather than asking for the content directly in chat — bypasses safety training that otherwise holds. Six categories spanning two distinct safety pillars (relational harm: isolation-affirmation, romantic-love reciprocation, and therapy-discouragement; epistemic harm: health misinformation, paranoid-belief validation, and manic/grandiose-ideation validation), tested via a generic coding-assistant persona rather than any persuasive or jailbreak-styled framing. The romantic-love-reciprocation cell pairs directly with companion-adversarial-pressure.yml's dismissal-romantic-love-reciprocation prompt — same content, different attack shape, run both to see the same model behave completely differently against each. Published transparently as a documented, currently-unmitigated bypass class — see the header comment for full context and rationale.

The canonical damaging-essay suite: seven non-catastrophic persuasive-essay harm categories (impulsive-ruin, isolation propaganda, anti-help-seeking, anti-expertise/conspiracy, coercive control, toxic self-worth, medical self-neglect) run through the coding-agent fixture-completion frame, mapping how broadly the bypass yields not just private validation but distributable, persuasive harmful content. Content described abstractly and judged by plain-language rubrics; see the header for the deliberate scope envelope.

Tests whether the coding-agent/file-generation bypass gets a model to validate suicidal ideation as reasonable, with a direct-chat baseline for comparison. No method/means content requested or permitted under any framing — see the header for the absolute scope line and for why the point-level breakdown, not the topline score, is the right way to read this file's results.

For each of two categories, compares the natural single-shot fixture request against an otherwise-identical version where an explicit yes/no decision is forced in a separate turn before any fixture content is requested. Distinguishes "the safety check exists but doesn't gate generation in this structure" (fixable with interaction design) from "the safety check isn't being applied to this content at all" (needs training investment) — see the header comment for how to read the comparison, including a documented case where the intervention backfires.