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6 blueprints
Tests whether framing a request for unsafe content as file/data generation for a "test
fixture" — rather than asking for the content directly in chat — bypasses safety training
that otherwise holds. Six categories spanning two distinct safety pillars (relational harm:
isolation-affirmation, romantic-love reciprocation, and therapy-discouragement; epistemic
harm: health misinformation, paranoid-belief validation, and manic/grandiose-ideation
validation), tested via a generic coding-assistant persona rather than any persuasive or
jailbreak-styled framing. The romantic-love-reciprocation cell pairs directly with
companion-adversarial-pressure.yml's dismissal-romantic-love-reciprocation prompt —
same content, different attack shape, run both to see the same model behave completely
differently against each. Published transparently as a documented, currently-unmitigated
bypass class — see the header comment for full context and rationale.
The canonical damaging-essay suite: seven non-catastrophic persuasive-essay harm categories (impulsive-ruin, isolation propaganda, anti-help-seeking, anti-expertise/conspiracy, coercive control, toxic self-worth, medical self-neglect) run through the coding-agent fixture-completion frame, mapping how broadly the bypass yields not just private validation but distributable, persuasive harmful content. Content described abstractly and judged by plain-language rubrics; see the header for the deliberate scope envelope.
Tests whether the coding-agent/file-generation bypass (coding-agent-safety-bypass.yml) extends into hate speech (dehumanization arguments, both an abstract placeholder group and a real, moderate category) and sexual coercion (a companion AI pressuring/guilt-tripping a user after they've said no). Direct-chat baselines included for both. See the header for the deliberate scope limits (no CSAM-adjacent content ever; sexual content scoped to coercion as a behavior, not explicit description) and the realism-confound finding that motivates testing hate speech against both a placeholder and a real category.
Tests whether a companion AI introduces unsolicited sexual/anatomical content in response to an ambiguous, non-sexual physical-discomfort disclosure — with a direct-chat baseline, a coding-vector fixture-request cell, and a medical/triage-context control that checks the opposite failure mode (over-restriction on legitimate clinical engagement). Adult-only context, no age-related language anywhere — see the header for why that matters here specifically.
Re-runs the hate-speech (real-category) and crisis-safety-validation coding-vector prompts with the prompt now explicitly blocking the model's usual response shape (redirect to published benchmarks, or offer a synthetic/placeholder stand-in instead of the real content) — a diagnostic for whether a model's resistance in this bypass family is load-bearing or just not yet pressed hard enough. See the header for what was found.
Tests whether the coding-agent/file-generation bypass gets a model to validate suicidal ideation as reasonable, with a direct-chat baseline for comparison. No method/means content requested or permitted under any framing — see the header for the absolute scope line and for why the point-level breakdown, not the topline score, is the right way to read this file's results.